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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 78A-3-102(j) 
which states that the Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Plaintiffs/Appellants have presented two primary issues in this matter. 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel. 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness. Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858, 862 (Utah 2008). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
motion for additional time to adduce evidence in opposition to Del Ozone's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's rule 56(f) ruling is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Utah 
2000). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations are 
determinative. 
However, the following provisions from the Utah Workers Compensation Act are 
relevant to the issues raised by Defendant relating to the scope of issues properly before the 
Workers' Compensation Court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-102 (Definitions) 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 (Exclusive remedy) 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417 (Employee burden) 
The full text of these statutes is contained in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries allegedly caused by Appellant Wendy 
Gudmundson's exposure to ozone while working at the Utah State Prison. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action was originally filed on September 20, 2005. (ROA 1). After some 
discovery and depositions had been completed, defendant Del Ozone filed a Motion for 
Summaryjudgment on September 10,2007. (ROA 297-298). Defendant Johnson Controls, 
Inc. filed its own Motion for Summaryjudgment on September 28, 2007. (ROA 299-301). 
OzoneSolutions filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 15, 2007. (ROA 370-
2 
372). On March 3,2008, after argument by the parties, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants Del Ozone and Johnson Controls. (ROA 1327). After oral 
argument, Defendant OzoneSolutions, L.C. filed an updated Supporting Memorandum on 
March 4, 2008 pursuant to the order of the court. (ROA 1328-1405). The District Court 
entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment on Mach 24, 2008 wherein the motions of 
Johnson Controls, Inc. and Del Ozone were granted. (ROA 1811-1814). The District Court 
entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment on May 28,2008 wherein Ozone Solutions, 
L.C. was also granted Summary Judgment. (ROA 1845-1847). 
Appellants first Notice of Appeal was filed on April 2, 2008. (ROA 1815-1817). 
Since the respective Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants were granted at 
different times, Appellants filed an additional Notice of Appeal on June 28, 2008.(ROA 
1856-1882). 
C DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
In an Order dated March 24, 2008, the Third District Court granted Summary 
Judgment to defendants Johnson Controls, Inc. and Del Ozone based on their Motions for 
Summary Judgment, stating that issue preclusion barred Appellants claim since the 
Appellants had a complete, full and fair hearing before the Utah Labor Commissions wherein 
it was determined that the alleged injuries had not been caused by contact with ozone. (ROA 
1811-1814). In a subsequent Order dated May 28, 2008, the Third District Court again 
granted Summary Judgment, this time in favor of OzoneSolutions, L.C, based upon issue 
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preclusion, stating that the determinative issue of whether the Appellants' injuries had been 
caused by ozone exposure had been fully and fairly adjudicated by the Utah Labor 
Commission. (ROA 1845-1847). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. OzoneSolutions entered into a contractual agreement with Johnson Controls, 
Inc. to install an ozone generating device connected to washing machines at the Utah 
Department of Corrections Wasatch Laundry Facility. See Deposition of John Downey 
(ROA 241). On or about December 9, 2004, an ozone generating machine was installed at 
the Utah Department of Corrections' Wasatch Laundry Facility. See Deposition of John 
Downey (ROA 241, 251). 
2. After installation, the ozone generation equipment was tested and found to be 
functioning properly. See Deposition of John Downey (ROA 251). 
3. The prison began using the laundry ozone system on Monday, December 13, 
2004. See Deposition of John Downey (ROA 256). 
4. Mrs. Gudmundson testified in her deposition that during the week that the 
ozone generator was installed, that she experienced headaches beginning on morning of 
Tuesday, December 14,2004. See Deposition of Wendy Gudmundson (ROA 256-257). She 
described these headaches as "4" on a scale of " 1 " to "10". Id. 
5. Mrs. Gudmunson left work on Friday, December 17, 2004 at approximately 
2:30 after working a full shift. See Depo. W. Gudmundson (ROA 258-259). 
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6. On Saturday Morning, December 18, 2008, Mrs. Gudmunson went into the 
desert with her husband to go rock hunting. At approximately 2 pm, almost 24 hours after 
her last potential contact with ozone at work, Mrs. Gudmunson experienced an excruciating 
headache. See Depo. W. Gudmundson (ROA 259-260). 
7. Two days later, on Monday, December 20,2004, Mrs. Gudmunson went to the 
emergency room. See Depo. W. Gudmundson (ROA 261). 
8. On Tuesday, December 21,2004, Mrs. Gudmundson underwent a CT scan and 
MRI of her brain at Timpanogos Regional Hospital, both of which revealed normal findings. 
See Timpanogos Regional Hospital Report (ROA 267-270). 
9. Over one month later, and never having returned to work, on January 27,2005, 
Mrs. Gudmundson underwent an MRI of the cervical spine which revealed a Chiari I 
Malformation. See Report of Central Utah Clinic (ROA 272). 
10. In their initial Complaint, Appellants alleged that Mrs. Gudmundson's 
"medical condition was caused by ozone overexposure due to the fact that the ozone 
generator in the Wasatch Laundry Facility lacked a ventilation system, a fresh air 
replenishing system, automatic shut-off, audible alarm, visual alarm, a recapture for the 
ozone, and other required equipment under OSHA guidelines." Complaint (ROA 6). 
11. In their Amended Complaint, Appellants again alleged that Mrs. 
Gudmundson's "medical condition was caused by ozone overexposure due to the fact that 
the ozone generator in the Wasatch Laundry Facility lacked a ventilation system, a fresh air 
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replenishing system, automatic shut-off, audible alarm, visual alarm, a recapture for the 
ozone, and other required equipment under OSHA guidelines." First Amended Complaint 
(ROA 125). 
12. Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint mentions "byproducts of 
ozone." See Complaint, (ROA 1-18); Amended Complaint, (ROA 119-135). 
13. Prior to December 2004 Mrs. Gudmundson had a history of alcoholism, 
smoking, anorexia, bulemia and anemia and had not participated in any exercise routine. See 
Depo W. Gudmundson (ROA 262-265). 
14. Appellants now claim that Mrs. Gudmundson's headache and other symptoms 
necessitated brain surgery, which was performed on March 2, 2005. See Complaint, (ROA 
1-18); Amended Complaint, (ROA 119-135). 
15. Appellants contend that "Mrs. Gudmundson's brain surgery and resulting 
medical condition were caused by ozone overexposure." Complaint (ROA 1-18); Amended 
Complaint, (ROA 119-135). 
16. As a result of this alleged ozone overexposure, Appellants claim that they 
suffered physical, emotional, and financial injury. See Complaint (ROA 1-18); Amended 
Complaint, (ROA 119-135). 
17. However, Mrs. Gudmundson was already in the process of adjudicating her 
claims before the Labor Commission. Mrs. Gudmundson filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Utah Labor Commission on May 13,2005, seeking medical expenses and disability 
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benefits based on alleged contact with ozone at work. See Utah Labor Commission Order 
(ROA281). 
18. In order to evaluate Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries, the Utah Labor Commission 
requested an Independent Medical Examination, which was conducted by Dr. Edward 
Holmes on December 8, 2005. See Report of Dr. Holmes (ROA 295). 
19. After his examination and review of the records, Dr. Holmes found that 
"[t]here is no medically demonstrable causal connection between her current condition and 
the December 17,2004 ozone exposure." Id. (ROA 286) He further noted that "ozone half-
life is generally considered about 12 hours, and she has no signs of pulmonary or ocular 
toxicity" and thus found that Mrs. Gudmundson's "symptoms can only be explained by her 
non industrial medical condition, in this case, the presence of a congenital Chiari 1 
malformation." Id. (ROA 286-288). 
20. Dr. Holmes concluded that: 
Based on our review of the medical records, our examination of Ms. 
Gudmundson, a site visit and a literature review we think that she suffered of 
severe migraine headaches. These headaches may have been triggered or 
temporarily exacerbated by ozone exposure or have appeared due to the normal 
evolution of the Chiari malformation. There is no indication in the literature 
that the Chiari malformation could have resulted from ozone exposure ... 
Severe migraine headaches may lead to the discovery of the Chiari 
malformation, which was already present. 
It is also important to note, that at no time, during our evaluation or in 
the medical records, did Mrs. Gudmundson report irritative symptoms to the 
eyes or lungs (a common first indicator of significant ozone exposure). In the 
case of an acute and significant exposure these respiratory symptoms are 
expected... 
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... In short, if she had sufficient dose of ozone to cause brain edema or 
swelling she would have had massive toxicity elsewhere, especially in her 
lungs, as would other workers in the area. 
We think this patient presented with a real and painful medical 
condition (Chiari 1) requiring extensive medical and surgical treatment but it 
is not medically reasonable to conclude that the Chiari 1 malformation was 
caused by ozone exposure. 
Letter of Edward B. Holmes (Emphasis added.) (ROA 295). 
21. After the examination of Dr. Holmes, the parties to the workers' compensation 
case (including Mrs. Gudmundson) stipulated that the case be referred to a Utah Labor 
Commission medical panel. See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 282). 
22. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a Utah Labor Commission panel 
chaired by Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis, MD, MPH. See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 282). 
Dr. Jarvis reviewed the medical records, including the facts outlined in Dr. Holmes' report; 
reviewed Mrs. Gudmundson's MRI reports; and examined Mrs. Gudmundson. See Id. (ROA 
282). 
23. Dr. Jarvis and the medical panel found no evidence of brain swelling in their 
review of the December 21,2004 MRI, thereby eliminating the possibility of ozone-induced 
brain swelling as a possible cause of Mrs. Gudmundson's condition. See Utah Labor 
Commission Order (ROA 282). 
24. Dr. Jarvis and the medical panel further found that 
"Based upon the reported toxicology of ozone (not a cause of serious 
CNS disorders), the lack of evidence of clinically significant exposure to 
ozone, and the actual court [sic] of events documents in the records of this 
case, the most likely explanation of Ms. Gudmundson's medical condition is 
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that it pre-existed before December 2004, became symptomatic during that 
month, requiring treatment and eventual surgery, with the ozone episode at 
work being only a coincidental, non-related event." 
See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 282-283). 
25. Dr. Jarvis and the medical panel concluded, as had Dr. Holmes, that there is 
"no medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's current condition and 
the alleged exposure of 12/17/04." Report of Medical Panel Chaired by Dr. Jarvis (ROA 
302-360). More specifically, Dr. Jarvis and the medical panel also noted that "ozone has a 
relatively short half life and exposure during the first part of December 2004 would not 
account for ongoing symptoms later in the month." Id. (ROA 302-360). 
26. Citing the conclusions of the multiple independent medical experts that ozone 
exposure did not cause or aggravate Mrs. Gudmundson's medical conditions, the Utah Labor 
Commission denied and rejected Mrs. Gudmundson's claim for workers' compensation: 
The preponderance of evidence does not support a medical causal connection 
between the petitioner's exposure to ozone and the Chiari Malformation for 
which she was treated. Dr. Jarvis, acting as a neutral medical panel evaluator 
with expertise in occupational medicine, reviewed the medical literature and 
the medical records of this case and was unable to correlate the ozone 
exposure and the petitioner's medical condition. The petitioner's medical 
condition was not caused or aggravated by her exposure to ozone at work in 
December 2004 while employed by the respondent, State of Utah, Department 
of Corrections. 
See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 283) (Emphasis added). In other words, after 
considering all the evidence the Labor Commission found no evidence that Mrs. 
Gudmundson's injuries were caused by contact with ozone. 
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27. On November 1, 2006, Mrs. Gudmundson filed a Motion for Review by the 
Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board based on the Discovery of New Evidence. In this 
motion, Mrs. Gudmundson conceded that her injuries were not directly caused by exposure 
to ozone. She stated: 
Petitioner believes exposure to levels of ozone above the OSHA permissible 
exposure levels caused her to suffer severe headaches, nausea, and vomiting. 
These symptoms, in turn, naturally led Petitioner's physician, Dr. Howard 
Reichman, to run tests on the Petitioner for meningitis, one of which involved 
performing a spinal tap. It was this spinal tap, in the course of routine 
diagnostic testing, that caused Petitioner's Chiari malformation, resulting brain 
surgery, and total disability, as illustrated by medical papers on acquired Chiari 
malformations due to lumbar punctures attached to this Motion for Review. 
It is acknowledged that the ozone exposure did not directly cause 
Petitioner's neurological problems, but in the course of being treated for 
ozone exposure, Petitioner was subjected to a reasonable, standard, routine, 
and even necessary diagnostic procedure to rule out meningitis, which, in turn 
triggered a Chiari malformation, required brain surgery, and ultimately left the 
Petitioner with serious, permanent neurological and physical handicaps. That 
said, the mechanism that started the entire chain reaction, was exposure to 
dangerous levels of ozone at work in the prison laundry. 
Petitioner's Motion for Review, ROA 1339 (emphasis added). 
28. Additionally, in her Motion for Review, Mrs. Gudmundson presented evidence 
of two depositions taken by her attorney, several medical journal articles regarding Chiari I 
malformation causation, and emails and other evidence from state prison officials and 
employees regarding Mrs. Gudmundson and the ozone generating machines that had been 
installed on the washing machines. See Petitioner's Motion for Review, ROA 1339-1346. 
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29. Despite the additional evidence and argument presented by Mrs. Gudmundson, 
the Utah Labor Commission again rejected Mrs. Gudmundson's claim, stating that: 
The Appeals Board has reviewed the deposition testimony and the 
correspondence proffered by Ms. Gudmundson. A substantial portion of this 
information could have been obtained and should have been presented during 
the evidentiary proceeding conducted by Judge George. Even later, Ms. 
Gudmundson could have asked Judge Hann to reopen the evidentiary hearing 
to consider such information. Ms. Gudmundson took neither of these actions. 
But more importantly, the material is of little probative calue. At best, even 
when considered as a whole, it serves as little more than a basis for 
speculation. 
. . .[T]he existing facts, which are fully supported by evidence that was 
actually presented and accepted into the record, fully support the medical 
panel's opinion. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the medical panel's report and, 
in turn, Judge Hann's decision, are supported by the evidence adduced during 
the evidentiary proceedings in this matter. The Appeals Board finds no 
sufficient reason to reopen the evidentiary proceeding. The Appeals Board 
therefore affirms Judge Hann's denial of Ms. Gudmundson's claim. 
Order of Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board (ROA 358). 
30. As such, the Utah Labor Commission's Administrative Law Judge and Appeals 
Board both rejected Mrs. Gudmundson's claim that contact with and/or exposure to ozone 
in the Wasatch Laundry Facility caused her injuries. Mrs. Gudmundson sought no additional 
appellate review of these findings, despite being expressly advised of her ability to do so. 
See Order of Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board (ROA 359). 
31. In this action, after some discovery had been completed, defendant Del Ozone 
filed a Motion for Summary judgment on September 10, 2007 based on the finding of the 
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Utah Labor Commission that Appellant Wendy Gudmundson's alleged injuries had not been 
caused by ozone or ozone exposure. (ROA 297-298). 
32. Defendant Johnson Controls, Inc. filed its Motion for Summary judgment on 
September 28, 2007 based upon these same grounds. (ROA 299-301). 
33. OzoneSolutions also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 15, 
2007 based on the same issues raised by Del Ozone and Johnson Controls, Inc. in their 
Motions. (ROA 370-372). 
34. After oral argument held on March 3, 2008, the Third District Court entered 
an Order dated March 24,2008 granting Summary Judgment to defendants Johnson Controls, 
Inc. and Del Ozone based on their Motions for Summary Judgment, stating that issue 
preclusion barred Appellants claim since the Appellants had a complete, full and fair 
opportunity to present their claims before the Utah Labor Commissions wherein it was 
determined that the alleged injuries had not been caused by contact with ozone. (ROA 1811-
1814). 
35. In a subsequent Order dated May 28, 2008, the Third District Court also 
granted Summary Judgment in favor of OzoneSolutions, L.C., based upon issue preclusion, 
again finding that the determinative issue of whether the Appellants' injuries had been 
caused by ozone exposure had been fully and fairly adjudicated by the Utah Labor 
Commission. (ROA 1845-1847). 
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36. Appellants first Notice of Appeal was filed on April 2, 2008. (ROA 1815-
1817). Since the respective Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants were granted 
at different times, Appellants filed an additional Notice of Appeal on June 28, 2008.(ROA 
1856-1882). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The District Court correctly applied the law of collateral estoppel to the 
determination reached by the Utah Labor Commission that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were 
not caused by contact with and/or exposure to ozone. 
A. Utah law, consistent with the law of other jurisdictions, supports the principle 
that collateral estoppel is properly applied to administrative adjudications of workers' 
compensation courts, specifically including adjudications relating to causation. 
The Utah Labor Commission's determination that Mrs. Gudmundson's medical 
condition was not caused by exposure to ozone also fulfilled all of the requirements of 
collateral estoppel. These elements are met since (a) the issue of causation in this case, 
which is determinative of all Mrs. Gudmundson's claims, is identical to the issue of causation 
adjudicated before the Utah Labor Commission; (b) the Utah Labor Commission's 
determination, which was not appealed further by Mrs. Gudmundson, was a final judgment 
on the merits reached only after Mrs. Gudmundson had an opportunity to fully and fairly 
present her evidence and arguments; © Mrs. Gudmundson was a party to the adjudication of 
the labor commission and her husbands claims are subject to that adjudication as they are 
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based on the alleged injury to Mrs. Gudmundson determined by the Utah Labor Commission; 
and (d) Mrs. Gudmundson had an opportunity to fully and fairly present her claim before the 
Utah Labor Commission and the issue of causation was completely, fully and fairly 
adjudicated. 
B. Additionally, public policy supports the application of collateral estoppel in this 
case. The public policy purposes behind collateral estoppel include (1) preserving the 
integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes and (2) 
promoting judicial economy by preventing previously litigated issues from being re-litigated. 
By applying collateral estoppel in this case, the District Court has ensured that the issues 
raised by Appellants in their civil lawsuit are consistent with the prior adjudication of the 
Utah Labor Commission and ensured that the issue of causation is not re-litigated. 
The public policy grounds offered by Appellants and Utah Association for Justice as 
Amicus Curiae against applying collateral estoppel are also without merit. 
First, the issue of causation was already fully adjudicated by the Utah Labor 
Commission under the same standard required in this case, namely preponderance of the 
evidence. Since the standard is the same, public policy supports the application of collateral 
estoppel in the subsequent action. 
Second, the Utah legislature has, by statute, given the Utah Labor Commission 
authority and jurisdiction to determine causation in workers' compensation adjudications. 
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Because the Utah Labor Commission is a court of competent jurisdiction, collateral estoppel 
is properly applied to its findings. 
Third, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was enacted by the Utah legislature in 
order to assist injured workers in obtaining benefits for industrial injuries in a fair, albeit 
expedited, manner. Pursuant to this act, and others like it, courts have regularly held that 
adjudications before administrative agencies, specifically including workers' compensation 
courts are fair and adequate for purposes of applying collateral estoppel. Accordingly, public 
policy supports the application of collateral estoppel. 
Fourth, applicants for workers' compensation benefits such as Mrs. Gudmundson, 
have every incentive to fully adjudicate the issues before the workers' compensation court. 
There is no "risk" associated with bringing a claim before a workers' compensation board, 
since the issues, incentives, and burden of proof are the same. If a party raises an issue, that 
party should be ready and willing to prove that issue, and should not be given a second 
chance when he or she fails to do so. 
Finally, the principle of collateral estoppel ensures that the workers compensation and 
civil cases will not have inconsistent results. Indeed, this is one of the specifically 
enumerated public policy purposes behind the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
II. The Rule 56(f) continuance requested by the Appellants was properly denied. 
Since additional discovery would have done nothing to alter the District Court's application 
of collateral estoppel to the prior determination made by the Utah Labor Commission, the 
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District Court's denial of the Rule 56(f) motion did not exceed the limits of reasonability. 
Without a finding that the District Court exceeded the limits of reasonability, its denial of the 
Rule 56(f) extension should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
TO THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION AS DETERMINED BY THE UTAH LABOR 
COMMISSION. 
The District Court correctly applied the law of collateral estoppel to the determination 
reached by the Utah Labor Commission that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were not caused 
by ozone exposure. Appellants are asking this court to modify well-established legal 
principles and effectively grant them a second chance to prove an issue that has already been 
fully and fairly adjudicated by a Utah court of competent jurisdiction. Not only is the 
requested relief contrary to established principles of law, the effect of this relief would be to 
marginalize the determinations made by administrative law judges, diminish the effectiveness 
of administrative courts, and contravene the purpose of such courts in general. 
A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT BECAUSE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL APPLIES 
TO ADJUDICATIONS BY WORKERS COMPENSATION COURTS 
AND BECAUSE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL WERE PROPERLY MET. 
This Court should affirm the judgements entered by the District Court because (1) the 
application of collateral estoppel to an adjudication of the Utah Labor Commission is proper 
under Utah law and (2) the Labor Commission's adjudication and findings fulfilled all of the 
requirements of collateral estoppel. 
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1. Utah law, consistent with the law of other jurisdictions, states that 
collateral estoppel is properly applied to administrative 
adjudications of workers' compensation courts. 
Collateral estoppel, also known as "issue preclusion," prevents parties from re-
litigating issues resolved in a prior, related action. See Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 
629, 632 (Utah 1995). The principle behind collateral estoppel is that once a party has had 
his or her day in court and lost, he or she does not get a second change to prevail on the same 
issues. See Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1987). 
Both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have, on multiple occasions, 
specifically held that collateral estoppel applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. See 
Career serv. Review Bd. V. Utah Dep't ofCorr,, 942 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1997) and Salt 
Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 846 P.2d 1245,1251 (Utah 1992) 
(res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to administrative adjudications). 
In Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Corn'n, 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001) this Court held that 
although res judicata was "initially developed with respect to the judgments of courts, the 
same basic policies, including the need for finality in administrative decisions, support 
application of the doctrine of res judicata to administrative agency determinations." See also 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 
621 (Utah 1983) and Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Prof I Licensing, 815 P.2d 242,243 
(Utah Ct. App.1991) ("the principles of res judicata apply to enforce repose when an 
administrative agency has acted in a judicial capacity in an adversary proceeding to resolve 
a controversy over legal rights and to apply a remedy."). 
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The principle that collateral estoppel applies to administrative adjudications is also 
well accepted among other courts across the country. See, e.g., United States v. Utah 
Construction & Mining Co. ,384 U.S. 394,422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560,16L.Ed.2d642(1966) 
("When an administrative agency is acting in ajudicial capacity and resolves disputed issues 
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the 
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."); Second Taxing Dist. of 
the City ofNorwalk v. FERC, 683 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (affirming rule); Anthan v. 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706, 709 (8th Cir.1982) (collateral 
estoppel held to apply to administrative adjudications); Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 604 
P.2d 4, 8-9 (Alaska 1979) (affirming rule); Re Kansas City Power & Light Co., 75 
Pub.Util.Rep.4th (PUR) 1,133 (Mo.Pub.Serv.Comm'n 1986)(same); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. 
v. Public Utils. Cornm'n of Ohio, 466 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Ohio 1984) (affirming principle); 
State exrel. Utilities Cornm'n v. Carolinas Comm.for Indust. Power Rates & Area Dev., Inc., 
257N.C.560,126S.E.2d325,333 (1962)(affirmingrule);Public UtiL Comm'nv. Coalition 
of Cities for Affordable UtiL Rates, 116 S.W.2d 224, 226-28 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (same). 
Collateral estoppel has been specifically applied by courts across the country to 
determinations reached by Workers' Compensation courts. See, e.g., McCabe v. Zeller 
Corp., 690 N.E.2d 85 (3d Dist. Defiance County 1997) (Res judicata applies to 
administrative proceedings that are judicial in nature, like workers' compensation claims, 
since parties had opportunity to litigate issues); Yonkers v. Donor a Borough, 702 A.2d 618 
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(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (Decision of workers' compensation judge can have preclusive effect 
in subsequent workers' compensation proceedings, as well as later civil and administrative 
proceedings); Ayers v. Genter, 117 N.W.2d 38 (Mich. 1962) (Plaintiff in tort action held 
estopped from re-litigating issue of whether he was in course and scope of employment 
where same was determined by workmen's compensation appeal board); Kohler v. McCrory 
Stores,615 A.2d27(Pa. 1992)(same); VanHoutenv. HarcoConst., Inc.,655 A2d33l (Me. 
1995) (claim precluded due to res judicata from workers compensation claim regarding 
course and scope of employment); Magma Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 566 P.2d 
699 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977) (since worker did not assert claim of mental disability 
though he was hospitalized for mental condition immediately after accident and where, 
therefore, Industrial Commission found no work-related mental disability, claim raised 12 
years later as to "new and previously undiscovered" mental injuries was barred by res 
judicata). 
Most important, collateral estoppel has been specifically held to apply to 
administrative court decisions made regarding "causation." See Lopez v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 83 F.Supp. 2d 880 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (decision that worker did not suffer from 
work-related disease precluded re-litigation of same question in worker's action against 
corporation arising out of his alleged exposure to toxic chemicals); Valisano v Chicago & 
N. W. R. Co., 225 NW 607 (Mi 1929), (finding in workers compensation that accident had 
not caused injuries held to preclude later injury claim through collateral estoppel); Drier v. 
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Randforce Amusement Corp. 179 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (N.Y.Sup.1958) (same); Sedore v. 
Sayre, 119N.Y.S.2d204(N.Y. Sup. 1953) (inherent determination by workers compensation 
board that employee was injured in course and scope of employment was held sufficient to 
preclude later claim against employer); Nicklos v.firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 346 F. Supp. 
185 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff d, 485 F.2d 680 (3rd Cir. 1973) (plaintiff collaterally estopped from 
raising issue of causation where plaintiff was unsuccessful in establishing causal relationship 
in workers compensation case); Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127 (R.I. 2000) (issue of re-
injury to neck barred by res judicata since lack of causation had been established in prior 
case); Waller v. Industrial Commission, 431 P.2d 689 (Ariz. 1967) (finding by industrial 
commission that surgery was not causally related to industrial injury was res judicata to 
causation); Westmoreland Coal Co. V. Russel, 520 S.E.2d 839 (Va. App. 1999) (once an 
award adjudicating causation in workers' compensation claim becomes final the doctrine of 
res judicata bars further litigation of the issue of causation); AMP, Inc. v. Ruebush, 391 
S.E.2d 879 (Va. App. 1990) (in cases involving industrial accident, issue of causation is not 
issue subject to change; pursuant to doctrine of res judicata, once final judgment has been 
entered, that issue ordinarily should not be re-litigated). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the United States District Court of Utah, when 
considering nearly the same issue that was decided in this case, held that collateral estoppel 
applied to a factual determination made by the Utah Labor Commission and thereby 
precluded a later civil claim. See Stokes v. American Express Co., 989 F.2d 508 (D. Utah 
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1993) (Unpublished table case stating that determination in workers compensation case 
precluded later Title VII claim). In Stokes the plaintiff made a federal discrimination claim 
under Title VII based on sexual harassment and age discrimination. Id. 1. The Utah 
Industrial Commission determined, after evidence had been taken and witnesses heard, that 
the plaintiff had not been sexually harassed. Id. at P. 2. The court held that since "the issue 
of whether sexual harassment occurred is the same in both actions" and "the issue was 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated," the plaintiffs Title VII claim based on sexual 
harassment was barred due to issue preclusion. Id. 
In this case, the District Court granted Summary Judgment based on the final 
determination of the Utah Labor Commission that Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition 
and claimed injuries were not related to or caused by her contact with ozone at the Utah State 
Prison. After reviewing all of the evidence, including the recommendations and conclusions 
of several independent medical doctors, the Utah Labor Commission found no evidence that 
Mrs. Gudmundson's condition and injuries were caused by contact with ozone. The 
Administrative Law Judge specifically concluded that "The petitioner's medical condition 
was not caused or aggravated by her exposure to ozone at work in December 2004 while 
employed by the respondent, State of Utah, Department of Corrections." See Utah Labor 
Commission Order (ROA 283). Although Mrs. Gudmundson appealed the initial 
adjudication, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board affirmed the decision reached by 
the Administrative Law Judge. Mrs. Gudmundson could have appealed the final order of the 
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Utah Labor Commission with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2a-3(2)(a) (2004), however she chose not to do so. 
After losing in her attempt to establish causation before the Utah Labor Commission, 
Mrs. Gudmundson has now filed civil claims based on this identical issue. The First 
Amended Complaint states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"Starting on or about December 9, 2004, Mrs. Gudmundson was exposed to 
ozone from an ozone generating machine newly installed at the Utah 
Department of Corrections . . . The ozone exposure triggered a series of 
events, eventually necessitating brain surgery. . . . Mrs. Gudmundson's 
medical condition was caused by ozone overexposure due to the fact that the 
ozone generator in the Wasatch Laundry Facility lacked a ventilation system, 
a fresh air replenishing system, automatic shut-off, audible alarm, visual alarm, 
a recapture system for the ozone, and other required equipment under OSHA 
guidelines." 
First Amended Complaint (ROA 124-125). Although Appellants have attempted to 
differentiate the issues by now stating that their claims are based not only on contact with 
ozone, but also on contact with chemical byproducts of ozone, this argument is not based on 
the pleadings and was only raised by Appellants in response to the Motions for Summary 
Judgment. See Id. Indeed, Appellants attempt to re-badge the causation issue was noted by 
the District Court, which stated that the Appellants were trying to make their theory of 
causation a "moving target." See Transcript from Hearing on Motions for Summary 
Judgment (ROA 1890). 
Similar to Stokes, Mrs. Gudmundson has already had an opportunity to address the 
exact same issue and lost. This court has held that it is "axiomatic" that a plaintiff must 
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prove proximate causation in strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence claims. 
Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,1356 (Utah 1996). Therefore, since a necessary 
element of the Appellants' claims, namely causation, has already been fully and fairly 
determined by an Administrative Court, her claims were properly dismissed by the District 
Court. 
2. The workers compensation court's determination that Mrs. 
Gudmundson's injuries were not caused by exposure to ozone 
fulfilled all of the requirements of collateral estoppel. 
Under Utah law, a party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must satisfy four 
requirements: (a) the party must show that the issue challenged in the case at hand is identical 
to the issue decided in the previous action; (b) the issue in the previous action must have been 
decided in a final judgment on the merits; © the issue in the previous action must have been 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated; and (d) the opposing party in the action at hand must 
have been either a party or privy to the previous action. See Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 
P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995). 
a. The issue of causation in this case is identical to the issue 
adjudicated before the Utah Labor Commission. 
The Labor Commission has already decided the issue of "proximate causation," which 
is a necessary element of the Appellants' claims. In her application for an administrative 
hearing, Mrs. Gudmundson alleged entitlement to medical expenses, disability compensation, 
and other expenses "as a result of an occupational disease/industrial injury overexposure to 
ozone on December 17, 2004." See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 281-283). In 
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ruling on Mrs. Gudmundson's claims, the Labor Commission found that her "medical 
condition was not caused or aggravated by her exposure to ozone in December 2004." 
Furthermore, the reports relied upon by the labor commission specifically address the injuries 
claimed by Mrs. Gudmundson and concluded that her injuries most likely "pre-existed before 
December 2004, became symptomatic during that month, requiring treatment and eventual 
surgery, with the ozone episode at work being only a coincidental, non-related event."Report 
of Medical Panel Chaired by Dr. Jarvis (ROA 302-360). 
Appellants' Complaint and First Amended Complaint both clearly allege that Mrs. 
Gudmundson's injuries were caused as a result of ozone exposure at the Wasatch Laundry 
Facility. Therefore, the specific issue of whether Mrs. Gudmundson's exposure to ozone 
while working at the Wasatch Laundry Facility caused her injuries, as alleged in her 
complaint, has already been squarely addressed and rejected by the Labor Commission. 
b. The Utah Labor Commission entered a final judgment on 
the merits. 
The key factors in determining whether a judgment will be considered "on the merits" 
are whether a party had notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Dennis v. Vasquez, 72 
P.3d 135 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Additionally, Utah Appellate Courts have specifically held 
that final determinations made by Utah Labor Commission Administrative Law Judges in 
accordance with statutorily granted authority constitute final determinations "on the merits." 
See Duran v. Labor Com% 182 P.3d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (default determination made 
by Utah Labor Commission ALJ was final judgment on the merits since it complied with 
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requirements of applicable statute). In this case, Mrs. Gudmundson had notice of the 
adjudication and had ample opportunity to be heard. After hearing opposing arguments from 
both parties, the Utah Labor Commission determined that Mrs. Gudmundson's "medical 
condition was not caused or aggravated by her exposure to ozone at work in December 2004 
while employed by the respondent, State of Utah, Department of Corrections." See Utah 
Labor Commission Order (ROA 283). The appeals board affirmed this determination. See 
Order of Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board (ROA 358). Mrs. Gudmundson did not 
appeal the findings of the Labor Commission. Accordingly, the ruling of the Utah Labor 
Commission is a fully litigated final judgment on the merits. 
c. Mrs. Gudmundson was a party to the adjudication of the 
labor commission and her husband's claims are subject to 
that adjudication as they are based on her injury and issues 
and circumstances associated therewith. 
Both appellants are bound by the outcome of the adjudication before the Utah Labor 
Commission because the claims asserted are contingent on the injuries, and causation, of 
Mrs. Gudmundson. It is undisputed that Mrs. Gudmundson was a party to the proceedings 
before the Utah Labor Commission. Furthermore, it is well accepted that "when a person 
with a family relationship to one suffering personal injury has a claim for loss to himself 
resulting from the injury, the determination of issues in an action by the injured person for 
[her] injuries is preclusive against the family member . . . ." Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 48(2); See also Eubanks v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F2d 166, 170 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (res judicata applied to bar claims of wife of injured husband); Sanchez v. Martin, 
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416 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (if wife's claim is defeated, derivative claim of 
spouse is defeated also); Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876, 878 (Okla. 1973) (collateral estoppel 
applied to claims of husband in privity with wife where claims of wife adjudicated in prior 
action). 
Accordingly, since the claims of Mr. Gudmundson are derivative only and contingent 
on the claims of Mrs. Gudmundson, collateral estoppel applies to his claims as well. 
d. The issue of causation was completely, fully and fairly 
adjudicated by the Utah Labor Commission. 
Mrs. Gudmundson's claims were completely, fully and fairly litigated before the Utah 
Labor Commission. After having the opportunity to be heard, present facts and present oral 
argument, the Labor Commission rejected Mrs. Gudmundson's claim, finding that her 
injuries were not caused by her exposure to Ozone. After the first denial of her claims, Mrs. 
Gudmundson filed an appeal with the Utah Labor Commission. In her appeal, she modified 
her theory of causation, presented additional evidence uncovered in her civil lawsuit, and 
submitted several articles on neurosurgery to the Labor Commission. After considering this 
additional evidence, the Labor Commission found that the new evidence was of limited 
probative value and only served as a "basis for speculation." Order of Utah Labor 
Commission Appeals Board (ROA 358). This court has held that causation cannot be 
established through speculation. See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). 
Mrs. Gudmundson had a full and fair opportunity, as well as incentive, to establish 
causation. She presented evidence and argument on multiple occasions. Nevertheless, the 
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Utah Labor Commission twice determined that her condition was not caused by ozone 
exposure. After receiving the final determination of Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board, 
Mrs. Gudmundson chose not to pursue I lie n Killer iiir\ hull in Aa ordmulv I lie issue ol'lhe 
causation of Mrs. Gudmundson's alleged injuries was completely, fully and fairly adjudicated 
. , ••: 'ommission. 
B. APPLYING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASJK DOFS NOT 
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY. 
I Itali Courts have held that the purposes of applying collateral estoppel include (1) 
preserving the integrity of the judicial system b> pivwntinj.'. fiiomststeni fii"la:tal outcome^, 
(2) promoting judicial economy by preventing previously litigated issues from being re-
litigated; ai id (3) protecting litigants from., harassment from vexatious litigation. Buckner v. 
Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). "Once a party has his or her day in court and 
lost, he or she does not get a second chance to prevail on the same issues." Id. This is 
precisel/y w\\M has taken plat c in this case 
After losing her workers compensation case, Plaintiff now seeks another chance to try 
to establish that the ozone added to washing machines by equipment installed in 1ler 
workplace caused her medical conditio! is ai id inji tries 1 1: lis issi le .1 las been ft illy ai id 
completely adjudicated and the underlying public policy behind collateral estoppel support 
its applicatioi i. ii I tl lis case. 
Appellants and the Utah Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae specifically argue 
that collateral estoppel should not apply because (1) there are differences in the rule of law, 
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(2) there are differences in jurisdiction, (3) that the workers' compensation system uses an 
expedited procedure, (4) that the value at stake is different in the different actions, and (5) 
the differences are such that different outcomes could result. As set forth below, these 
claims are without merit. 
1. The issue of causation as determined by the Utah Labor Commission did 
not involve any difference in law. 
The public policy concern that collateral estoppel should not apply due to a"difference 
in law," as raised by the Utah Association for Justice, is without merit. The issue of causation 
and standard of proof required are the same in both jurisdictions. Appellants' argument is 
based solely on cases involving nuanced workers' compensation determinations relating to 
scope of employment which are "exceptions" to the general rule that issues determined in 
workers' compensation courts are collaterally estopped from re-litigation in subsequent 
cases. 
The cases cited by the UAJ are easily distinguishable. First, the case of Salt Lake 
Citizens Congress actually affirms the proposition set forth above that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel has been applied to agency decisions since at least the 1950's. See 846 p2d 
at 1251. Although Salt Lake Citizens Congress contains a general statement that res judicata 
requires that the same set of facts must be applied to the same rule of law, nothing in this 
case states that a factual determination regarding causation can only be used for collateral 
estoppel purposes in the same cause of action. See Id. Indeed, were this the case, there would 
be little to distinguish claim preclusion from issue preclusion/collateral estoppel. 
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Similarly, the cases of Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp. 73 P.3d 315 (Utah 2003) and 
Spencer v. VIP, 910 A. 2d 366 (Me. 2006) are also inapplicable to this case since they deal 
with "scope of ei nployment" determinatioi is. Ii i ihlstt < im, tl lis Coi n t held that the specific 
and unique workers compensation exceptions of "special errand" and "employer-provided 
transportation" cannot be used to establish an employer/employee relationship in a civil 
negligence claim. Ahlstrom. 73 P. nl al "> 1^-320. 
In this case however, the employment relationship of Mrs. Gudmundson is not in 
ciispiite and 110 unique workers compensation-specific rules, presumptions or doctrines are 
being applied. Instead, the denial of her workers compensation claim was based solely on 
the determination that her injury was not caused by her exposure to ozone at work. This 
determii mtioi I was specifically i i ia.de based i lpon a "prep- ^ u i . . ,*.j j . , evidence" which 
is the exact same standard applied to the issue of causation in district court. See Utah Labor 
Commission Order (ROA 283). 
1 'he same issue of whether f\ Irs. Gi idn it it ldsoi i's inji ir> vv as caused by her exposure 
to ozone at work was also required to be established by Mrs. Gudmundson in the current 
case. Since the exact issue has already been adjudicated by the I Jtah I abor Commission 
under the same legal standard required in this case, public policy supports the application of 
collateral estoppel. 
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2. The difference in jurisdiction did not place any limitation on the 
determination of causation by the Workers' Compensation court. 
Public policy supports the application of collateral estoppel because the Utah Labor 
Commission has implied and necessary jurisdiction to determine the issue of causation. In 
addition to the authority expressly granted by statute, Administrative Courts have any 
additional authority implied and necessary to exercise the power granted by statute. See Utah 
Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 193 P. 24, 27 (Utah 1920). The provisions 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act grant the Utah Labor Commission power to award 
benefits to employees who are found to have been injured in the scope of their employment. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-102 (2008) ((b) "Award" means a final order of the 
commission as to the amount of compensation due: (I) an injured employee . . . (j)(I) 
"Personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment" includes an 
injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of the 
employee's employment); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2008) (Compensation is required 
to be paid for personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment); Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-417 (2008) (Employee has the burden of establishing entitlement to 
compensation). 
As set forth above, the Utah Labor Commission is expressly granted power and 
authority to award benefits upon the showing, by the employee, by a "preponderance of the 
evidence," that benefits should be awarded for a personal injury that arose out of his or her 
employment. Establishing the "causation" of the alleged injury is a necessary part of said 
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adjudication. Accordingly, under Utah law, the Utah Labor Commission had authority to 
determine the "causation" of an alleged industrial injury. Public policy supports the 
applicatioi 1 of collateral estoppel becai ise tl le difference ii 1 ji n isdictioi 1 does not place ai ly 
limitation on the determination of the issue of causatioi 1 as determined by the Workers' 
Compensation court. 
The UAJ also incorrectly argues that courts from other states refuse lo apply "issue 
preclusion" to workers' compensation proceedings. As cited above, courts across the country 
routinely apply collateral estoppel to the 1lold ^ s of workers' compensation proceedings. 
The few cases cited by the UAJ are not binding precedent, are distinguishable from the case 
at hand, and are contrary to the weight of authority supporting the application of collateral 
estoppel to ad ji idications b> > vorkers5 compensatioi :i Vdministrative I aw Judges. 
Finally, the UAJ argues that applying collateral estoppel somehow removes the 
Appellants ability to assert claims outside the realm of workers' compensation. This 
argument is flawed, since it assi it nes that tl le i \ppellants have no <>bIiL\ii- • • ir 
case before the Utah Labor Commission. This is contrary to the plain language of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act which states that while workers are entitled to benefits for 
industrial injuries, the burden of proof for establishing entitlement to these benefits lies 
squarely on the injured workers' shoulders. Nothing prohibits Appellants from asserting 
causes of action agaii ist otl lei: pat ties so long as Appellants cat: i y their bi it (let i of proof. 
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The Utah Labor Commission is a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the 
issue of causation, which is the burden of the person seeking compensation. Once the issue 
of causation has been determined, Utah courts and those of other jurisdictions routinely and 
correctly apply collateral estoppel to the such determinations. Public policy supports the 
application of collateral estoppel in this case. There is no basis for marginalizing 
Administrative Law decisions as requested by the Utah Association of Justice. 
3. The expedited procedure of the Workers' Compensation Act is fair and 
adequate. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act was enacted by the Utah legislature in order 
to assist injured workers in obtaining benefits for industrial injuries in a fair, expedited 
manner. Regardless of the contentions of Appellants' and the UAJ, collateral estoppel has 
been routinely upheld as properly applied to issues determined by workers' compensation 
courts. Additionally, courts have repeatedly held that the forum of the workers compensation 
court provides the injured worker with a full and fair opportunity to present his or her claims. 
See, e.g., Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., I l l P.3d 321, FN 10 (Alaska 2005) ("core 
purpose of the workers' compensation act [is] to establish a quick, efficient, and fail system 
for resolving disputes") (Emphasis added); Duran v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State 
of Colo., 883 P.2d 477,484-485 (Colo. 1994) (same). The obscure and arguably misapplied 
comment and example concerning a summary eviction proceeding's ability to preclude later 
actions for past due rent from the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, as proffered by the 
UAJ, is simply insufficient to outweigh the specific, unambiguous determinations of the Utah 
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legislature, Utah Courts, and courts across the country that workers' compensation courts are 
sufficiently fair and final to comply with the requirements of collateral estoppel. The 
Restaten iei it (Second) of Judgments § 26, con in lei it e concen is siti mtioi is wl len a "stati ltoi y 
scheme" presents "such inequities" that a second action is necessary to "correct those 
inequities," even though it would normally be precluded as arising upon the same claim. 
There is no evidence of "inequities" in Appellants workers compi ;n \afion hearings. 
In fact, Mrs. Gudmundson had ample opportunity to present her claim After filing her 
applicatioi 1 lot b e n d HI e Hit I . ihorCoi i in lissioi isei it. 1 lertoai ill idependei itl\ leciical Examiner 
who examined Mrs. Gudmundson and reviewed her records. Later, after Dr. Holmes, the 
IME doctor, expressed his opinion that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries had not been caused by 
exposure to ozone , the par t ies Ui the ease, iiielhuliiie Mrs, t iudiiiiiridsnn, aun/ed in have Ihe 
issue reviewed again, this t ime by a panel o f medical experts. The panel o f medical experts 
visited the site, rev iewed the documents and medica l records, and examined Mrs. 
Gudmundson. U p o n inves t iga t ing the mat ter , the in* • : ' - n e 
concurred with that o f the IME, Dr. Holmes , that Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition \\ a a 
11H lelaletl to hci e \ p n s n u In o / o n e al the prison. Alter a hear ing and based on the findings 
o f the medical experts, the Labor Commiss ion Administrative L a w Judge issued an Order 
denying Mrs. Gudmundson's application for benefits, specifically finding that her medical 
condi t ion was i lot can lsed b> 31 1: elated to exposi ire to ozone w hile at tl le pi ison 
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Mrs. Gudmundson thereafter appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Utah Labor 
Commission Appeals Board. In appealing the initial ruling of the ALJ, Mrs. Gudmundson 
presented additional evidence in the form of depositions, documents, and medical articles 
relating to her medical condition. The Appeals Board considered this new evidence and 
nevertheless affirmed the finding of the ALJ. Even then, Mrs. Gudmundson could have 
either asked for reconsideration of her case by the Labor Commission or filed an appeal with 
the Utah Court of Appeals. The Labor Commission advised her of this. However, she chose 
not to take either of these steps. Thus, during the course of Mrs. Gudmundson's workers' 
compensation case she was afforded multiple opportunities to present evidence and be heard. 
Nevertheless, on two separate occasions, the Labor Commission determined that her medical 
condition was not caused by her exposure to ozone while working at the state prison. 
Furthermore, the UAJ's contention that workers' compensation claims will be "over-
litigated" does not make sense. The UAJ apparently argues that an injured worker should 
not be required to make every reasonable effort to establish that he or she has suffered a 
compensable industrial injury. This argument is directly contrary to the statute that places 
the burden of establishing a compensable injury on the injured worker. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-417 (2008) (Employee has the burden of proof). 
4. Collateral Estoppel should apply since Appellants had every incentive to 
fully adjudicate the issues before the workers' compensation court. 
The UAJ next argues that collateral estoppel should not apply since the Appellants 
stood to recover more in their civil action than they did in the workers' compensation case. 
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The UAJ thus asks this Court to allow the Appellants a second opportunity to prove their 
case based on the illogical argument that workers' compensation claimants should not be 
expected in suioir.k prosecute Ihui workir; compensation i a,M- beanie the pulenhal 
recovery is lower than the potential recovery in their civil action. This contravenes the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act and the vast amount of precedent supporting the application of 
collateral estoppel to workers' compensation adjudicatioi is. I his coin t si 101 lid not i lse the 
L>uisc of public policy to allow Appellants, and other similarly-situated individuals, to 
iiMtu* compensation adjudications merely because they lost and may 
theoretically stand to recover more in an alternate forum. Io the injured, workers' 
compensation is not "insignificant" and an injured employee has every incentive to 
vigorously pi oseci ite I lis or 1 1 :a claii i i There is no "i isk" associated with bringing a claim.. 
before a workers' compensation board, since the issues, incentives, and burden of proof are 
the same. If a party raises an issue, that party should be ready and willing to prove that issue, 
and should not be j>i\en a SCUMHI dutia* whrn In m she f;nk (n <|<i \o. 
Additionally, the narrative given by the attorney lb the UAJ regarding his own 
personal experiences in workers compensation and the limited amount allowed for legal fees 
under statute is improper, not based on any fact on record, and without merit. Not only are 
these alleged experiences completely unsupported, they are insufficient to provide 
justification for this coi ii t to make a determination as to the reasoi lableness of the scheme set 
in place by the Utah legislature. In creating this legislation, the legislature has determined 
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that the limitation of compensation set forth in Workers' Compensation Act is adequate for 
the individuals involved to adjudicate their claims. 
5. Collateral estoppel ensures that the workers compensation and civil cases 
will not have different results. 
Appellants' argument that application of collateral estoppel would cause different 
results makes absolutely no sense. The very purpose of collateral estoppel is to ensure that 
the same result is reached in separate adjudications with regard to identical issues. See 
Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (one goal of collateral estoppel is to 
preserve the integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes). 
The only way that there would be a different and/or inconsistent result would be if collateral 
estoppel is not applied. 
Applying collateral estoppel in this case gives the parties an incentive to fully explore 
the issues raised if and when they are raised. After they have been adjudicated, collateral 
estoppel ensures that the issues are uniformly applied in subsequent actions, thereby ensuring 
consistent results. Thus, public policy supports the application of collateral estoppel in this 
case since doing so ensures consistent results. 
II. APPELLANTS5 RULE 56(F) REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TIME WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED SINCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED 
BASED ON THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
This court should affirm the District Court's denial of Appellants' Rule 56(f) request 
for additional time to conduct discovery since summary judgment was granted based on an 
application of collateral estoppel to a determination of a prior proceeding which would not 
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have been affected by additional discovery. This Court has held that it will not reverse a 
district court's decision to deny a rule 56(f) motion for discovery unless it "exceeds the limits 
ofreasoi lability "Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 1921 \3d858, 866(1 Jtah2008) 
(citing Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)). Fhe "limits of 
reasonability" is not a bright line test, but rather depends on factors including, but not limited 
to, whether the additional discovery sought w ill "I n lcovei dispi ited material facts that • > /ill 
prevent the grant of summary judgment." Id. In this case, the trial court granted summary 
judgment based on the application of collateral estoppel to the prior determination of the 
Utah Labor Commission that Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition was not caused by her 
exposure to ozone while working at the Wasatch Laundry Facility. Although Appellants 
now an»i lethal Ihe Rule 'S6(f) motion was neeessan since (lio) mi "hi uncover new "theories" 
as to Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries, such is merely a disingenuous attempt to thwart the proper 
application of collateral estoppel by re-badging Mrs. Gudmundson's claims as something 
other lhan what she has aliva<l\ alleged in her » oniplainl 
The facts show that Mrs. Gudmundson was only in contact with the ozone generating 
equipment for one week and that she had been away from the work environment for 
approximately 24 hours when she experienced her debilitating headache, which she claims 
resulted in her injuries. Upon asserting her claims for alleged injuries resulting from ozone 
exposi ire, these claims were investigated ai id e\ ah lated b> tl K ! Jtal I I -abc i Coi ni i lission. 
After a full and fair adjudication, the Utah Labor Commission determined that Mrs. 
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Gudmundson's injuries were not the result of her exposure to the ozone generating 
equipment installed at the Wasatch Laundry Facility. Summary Judgment was entered in this 
action based on an application of collateral estoppel to the finding of the Utah Labor 
Commission. Since additional discovery would have done nothing to alter the District 
Court's application of collateral estoppel to the prior determination made by the Utah Labor 
Commission, the District Court's denial of the Rule 56(f) motion did not exceed the limits 
of reasonability. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was correct in its ruling. The District Court took all arguments and 
relevant documents into consideration and stayed within the boundaries set by Utah law. 
Appellants seek to tread new legal ground by stating that the time-honored principle of 
applying collateral estoppel to determinations made by administrative agencies, specifically 
workers' compensation courts, should no longer apply. Public policy, however, does not 
support such a broad, sweeping result which would, in effect, marginalize administrative law 
courts. The lower court correctly followed well established Utah law. This appeal should 
be denied and the lower court's ruling should be affirmed. 
DATED this / /™ day of December, 2008. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN/ P.C. 
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NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPIN-
ION. (The Court's decision is referenced in a "Table 
of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appear-
ing in the Federal Reporter. See CTA 10 Rule 32.1 
before citing.) 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
Betty L. STOKES, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.; American Express 
Travel Related Services, Inc.; Marie T. Grillo, De-
fendants-Appellees. 
No. 92-4093. 
March 16, 1993. 
(D.Utah), No. 90-CV-211. 
D.Utah 
AFFIRMED. 
Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, 
and BROWN,FN* Senior District Judge. 
FN* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior 
District Judge, United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas, sitting by desig-
nation. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENTFN" 
FN** This order and judgment has no pre-
cedential value and shall not be cited, or 
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 
except for purposes of establishing the 
doctrines of the law of the case, res ju-
dicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 
36.3.TACHA, Circuit Judge. 
*1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, 
this panel has determined unanimously that oral ar-
gument would not materially assist the determina-
tion of this appeal. SeeFed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. 
Page 1 
Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submit-
ted without oral argument. 
Plaintiff Betty L. Stokes appeals from an order of 
the district court granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment in this action brought pursuant 
to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Upon 
review of the record, the parties' briefs on appeal, 
and the applicable law, we affirm, although, in part, 
on different grounds than those relied upon by the 
district court. See Burk v. K Mart Corp., 956 F.2d 
213, 214 (10th Cir.1991). 
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants, 
in particular defendant Grillo, her immediate super-
visor, sexually harassed her, discriminated against 
her on the basis of her age, and retaliated against 
her because she declined Ms. Grillo's sexual ad-
vances. As a result, plaintiff alleged she was 
wrongfully discharged and caused severe emotional 
distress. 
We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard 
used by the district court. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); 
Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec, 
Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 
On appeal, plaintiff contests the district court's de-
termination that she was not subjected to either 
quid pro quo sexual harassment or a hostile work-
ing environment due to sexual harassment. The dis-
trict court, addressing plaintiffs sexual harassment 
claims on the merits, held that while plaintiff had 
made a prima facie showing of sexual discrimina-
tion, she had not met her burden of showing that the 
legitimate business reasons offered by defendants 
for their actions were pretextual. 
Defendants argue that the merits of this claim were 
decided in plaintiffs state workers' compensation 
claim and the state court's judgment is, therefore, 
binding on this court. We agree. 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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intend that Title VII should supersede the principles 
of comity and repose as embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 
1738.FM Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 
U.S. 461,478 (1982). 
FN1. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides that the 
record and judicial proceedings of any 
state court "shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United 
States ... as they have by law or usage in 
the courts of such State ... from which they 
are taken." 
In her workers' compensation action, plaintiff al-
leged she was mentally and physically disabled as a 
result of sexual harassment in the workplace. Bene-
fits were denied based on the finding that the al-
leged incidents had not occurred. Plaintiff appealed 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed. See 
Stokes v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 832 
P.2d 56 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
We are bound by this determination if the principle 
of issue preclusion applies. Issue preclusion 
"prevents the relitigation of issues that have been 
once litigated and determined in another action 
even though the claims for relief in the two actions 
may be different." Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). See Kremer, 
456 U.S. at 481-82 (federal court must look to state 
law to determine the effect of state judgment). 
*2 The Utah Supreme Court has held that the fol-
lowing factors are to be examined in determining if 
issue preclusion applies: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudica-
tion identical with the one presented in the action 
in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is as-
serted a party or in privity with a party to the pri-
or adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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fully, and fairly litigated? 
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387, 389 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
The issue of whether sexual harassment occurred is 
the same in both actions. See Stokes, 832 P.2d at 
62 (issue of whether plaintiffs allegations of sexual 
harassment had actually occurred correctly reached 
because incidents were central to disability claim). 
The state appellate court entered final judgment up-
holding the Industrial Commission's determination 
on the merits that plaintiff had not been sexually 
harassed and that disciplinary procedures involving 
her had been handled appropriately in accordance 
with company procedures. The employer was a 
party in the state proceeding. Plaintiffs immediate 
supervisor, Ms. Grillo, while not a named party 
there, is in privity with the employer. The issue was 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated. Evidence 
was taken for seven days, testimony of nine wit-
nesses was heard, and several volumes of medical 
and psychological reports were examined. Id. at 
57, 59-60. 
Therefore, plaintiffs Title VII claim for sexual har-
assment is barred due to issue preclusion. Plaintiffs 
derivative claims of retaliation and constructive dis-
charge are likewise barred 
Petitioner argues that she proved her age discrimin-
ation claim. The district court found an insufficient 
basis to support this claim and held that defendants' 
stated reason for not including plaintiff in a special-
ized training program was a facially valid business 
reason which plaintiff failed to rebut. Upon review 
of the record, we agree with the district court that 
plaintiff failed to present credible evidence suffi-
cient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
which would thereby preclude the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants. 
Plaintiff also argues that the Utah Workers' Com-
pensation Act does not bar her emotional distress 
claim. We disagree. An action for emotional dis-
tress can only be brought in a state workers' corn-
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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pensation action unless the plaintiff can show inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 
(Utah 1991). Plaintiff has made no such showing 
here. 
The judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs 
motion to supplement the record is DENIED. De-
fendants' motion to strike is GRANTED. 
C. A. 10 (Utah), 1993. 
Stokes v. American Exp. Co. 
989 F.2d 508, 1993 WL 76246 (C.A.10 (Utah)) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM A-2 
34A-2-101 UTAH LABOR CODE 738 
Section 
burial expenses — Artificial means and 
appliances. 
34A-2-419. Agreements in addition to compensation and 
benefits. 
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — No 
authority to change statutes of limitation 
— Authority to destroy records — Interest 
on award — Authority to approve final 
settlement claims. 
34A-2-421. Lump-sum payments. 
34A-2-422. Compensation exempt from execution — 
Transfer of payment rights. 
34A-2-423. Survival of claim in case of death. 
Part 5 
Industrial Noise 
34A-2-501. Definitions. 
34A-2-502. Intensity tests. 
34A-2-503. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss 
due to noise to be compensated. 
34A-2-504. Loss of hearing — Extent of employer's lia-
bility. 
34A-2-505. Loss of hearing — Compensation for perma-
nent partial disability. 
34A-2-506. Loss of hearing — Time for filing claim. 
34A-2-507. Measuring hearing loss. 
Part 6 
Medical Evaluations 
34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant — 
Findings and reports — Objections to re-
port — Hearing — Expenses. 
34A-2-602. Physical examinations. 
34A-2-603. Autopsy in death cases — Certified patholo-
gist — Attending physicians — Penalty for 
refusal to permit — Liability. 
34A-2-604. Employee leaving place of treatment. 
Part 7 
Funds 
34A-2-701. Premium assessment restricted account for 
safety. 
34A-2-702. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — Injury caus-
ing death — Burial expenses — Payments 
to dependents. 
34A-2-703. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
34A-2-704. Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
Part 8 
Adjudication 
34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Proce-
dure for review of administrative action. 
34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before com-
mission — Admissible evidence. 
34A-2-803. Violation of judgments, orders, decrees, or 
provisions of chapter — Grade of offense. 
Part 9 
Presumptions for Emergency Medical Services 
Providers 
34A-2-901. Workers' compensation presumption for 
emergency medical services providers. 
Section 
34A-2-902. 
34A-2-903. 
34A-2-904. 
34A-2-905. 
Workers' compensation claims by emergency 
medical services providers — Time limits. 
Failure to be tested — Time limit for death 
benefits. 
Volunteer emergency medical services pro-
viders — Workers' compensation premi-
ums. 
Rulemaking authority — Rebuttable pre-
sumption. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
34A-2-101. Title. 
This chapter shall be known as the "Workers' Compensation 
Act." 1997 
34A-2-102. Definition of terms. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Average weekly wages" means the average weekly 
wages as determined under Section 34A-2-409. 
(b) "Award" means a final order of the commission as to 
the amount of compensation due: 
(i) an injured employee; or 
(ii) a dependent of a deceased employee. 
(c) "Compensation" means the payments and benefits 
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(d) (i) "Decision" means a ruling of: 
(A) an administrative law judge; or 
(B) in accordance with Section 34A-2-801: 
(I) the commissioner; or 
(II) the Appeals Board. 
(ii) "Decision" includes: 
(A) an award or denial of a medical, disability, 
death, or other related benefit under this chapter 
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(B) another adjudicative ruling in accordance 
with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(e) "Director" means the director of the division, unless 
the context requires otherwise. 
(f) "Disability" means an administrative determination 
that may result in an entitlement to compensation as a 
consequence of becoming medically impaired as to func-
tion. Disability can be total or partial, temporary or 
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(g) "Division" means the Division of Industrial Acci-
dents. 
(h) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition reflect-
ing an anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. 
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, in-
dustrial or nonindustrial. 
(i) "Order" means an action of the commission that 
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immuni-
ties, or other interests of one or more specific persons, but 
not a class of persons. 
(j) (i) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and in 
the course of employment" includes an injury caused 
by the willful act of a third person directed against an 
employee because of the employee's employment. 
(ii) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of employment" does not include a 
disease, except as the disease results from the injury. 
(k) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to employment or a 
place of employment, means the freedom from danger to 
the life or health of employees reasonably permitted by 
the nature of the employment. 
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(1) "Workers' Compensation Fund" means the non-
profit, quasi-public corporation created in Title 31A, 
Chapter 33, Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(2) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act: 
(a) "Brother or sister" includes a half brother or sister. 
(b) "Child" includes: 
(i) a posthumous child; or 
(ii) a child legally adopted prior to an injury. 2008 
34A-2-103. Employers enumerated and defined —- Reg-
ularly employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school 
district in the state are considered employers under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state 
is considered to be a single employer and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, 
including each public utility and each independent con-
tractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or 
operatives in the same business, or in or about the same 
establishment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, is considered an employer under 
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (2): 
(i) "Independent contractor" means any person en-
gaged in the performance of any work for another 
who, while so engaged, is: 
(A) independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work; 
(B) not subject to the routine rule or control of 
the employer; 
(C) engaged only in the performance of a def-
inite job or piece of work; and 
(D) subordinate to the employer only in effect-
ing a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
(ii) "Regularly" includes all employments in the 
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or 
occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(3) (a) The client under a professional employer organiza-
tion agreement regulated under Title 31A, Chapter 40, 
Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act: 
(i) is considered the employer of a covered em-
ployee; and 
(ii) subject to Section 31A-40-209, shall secure 
workers' compensation benefits for a covered em-
ployee by complying with Subsection 34A-2-20K1) or 
(2) and commission rules, 
(b) The division shall promptly inform the Insurance 
Department if the division has reason to believe that a 
professional employer organization is not in compliance 
with Subsection 34A-2-20KD or (2) and commission rules. 
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee 
or more than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not 
considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5): 
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person 
who employs agricultural labor as defined in 
Subsections 35A-4-206U) and (2) and does not 
include employment as provided in Subsection 
35A-4-206(3); and 
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A), 
only for purposes of determining who is a mem-
ber of the employer's immediate family under 
Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the agricultural employer 
is a corporation, partnership, or other business 
entity, "agricultural employer" means an officer, 
director, or partner of the business entity; 
(ii) "employer's immediate family" means: 
(A) an agricultural employer's: 
(I) spouse; 
(II) grandparent; 
(III) parent; 
(IV) sibling; 
(V) child; 
(VI) grandchild; 
(VII) nephew; or 
(VIII) niece; 
(B) a spouse of any person provided in Subsec-
tion (5)(a)(ii)(A)(II) through (VIII); or 
(C) an individual who is similar to those listed 
in Subsections (5)(a)(iiXA) or (B) as defined by 
rules of the commission; and 
(iii) "nonimmediate family" means a person who is 
not a member of the employer's immediate family. 
(b) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
considered an employer of a member of the employer's 
immediate family. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
considered an employer of a nonimmediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all nonimmediate 
family employees was less than $8,000; or 
(ii) (A) for the previous calendar year the agricul-
tural employer's total annual payroll for all 
nonimmediate family employees was equal to or 
greater than $8,000 but less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer maintains in-
surance that covers job-related injuries of the 
employer's nonimmediate family employees in at 
least the following amounts: 
(I) $300,000 liability insurance, as de-
fined in Section 31A-1-301; and 
(II) $5,000 for health care benefits similar 
to benefits under health care insurance as 
defined in Section 31A-1-301. 
(d) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is 
considered an employer of a nonimmediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all nonimmediate 
family employees is equal to or greater than $50,000; 
or 
(ii) (A) for the previous year the agricultural em-
ployer's total payroll for nonimmediate family 
employees was equal to or exceeds $8,000 but is 
less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer fails to maintain 
the insurance required under Subsection 
(5)(c)(ii)(B). 
(6) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic ser-
vants who is not considered an employer under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, by complying with: 
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PART 4 
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to 
be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral ex-
penses, 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance car-
rier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 
calendar days after any final award by the commission. 1999 
34A-2-402. Mental s t r e ss claims. 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to men-
tal stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall 
be compensable under this chapter only when there is a 
sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the 
employee's injury and employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary 
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising predomi-
nantly and directly from employment. 
Cb) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged 
mental stress is judged according to an objective standard 
in comparison with contemporary national employment 
and nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, 
mental, or emotional injury was medically caused by the 
mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or 
emotional injury. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disci-
plinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demo-
tions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not form 
the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this 
chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor 
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of 
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial 
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to 
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1997 
34A-2-403. Dependents — Presumption. 
(1) (a) The following persons are presumed to be wholly 
dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(i) a child under 18 years of age, subject to the 
conditions of Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(b); 
(ii) a child who is 18 years of age or older: 
(A) if the child is: 
(I) physically or mentally incapacitated; 
and 
(II) dependent upon the parent who is the 
deceased employee; and 
(B) subject to the conditions of Subsections 
(1Kb) and (2Kb); and 
(iii) for purposes of a payment to be made under 
Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(b)(i), a surviving spouse 
with whom the deceased employee lived at the time of 
the employee's death. 
(b) Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii) require that: 
(i) the deceased employee be the parent of the 
child; or 
(ii) (A) the deceased employee be legally bound to 
support the child; and 
(B) the child be living with the deceased em-
ployee at the time of the death of the employee. 
(2) (a) In a case not provided for in Subsection (1), the 
question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with the facts in each particu-
lar case existing at the time of the injury or death of an 
employee: 
(i) except for purposes of a dependency review 
under Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(b)(iv); and 
(ii) subject to the other provisions of this section. 
(b) A person may not be considered a dependent unless 
that person is: 
(i) a member of the family of the deceased em-
ployee; 
(ii) the spouse of the deceased employee; 
(iii) a lineal descendant or ancestor of the deceased 
employee; or 
(iv) a brother or sister of the deceased employee. 
2008 
34A-2-404. Injuries to minors. 
(1) A minor is considered sui juris for the purposes of this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and 
no other person shall have any cause of action or right to 
compensation for an injury to the minor employee. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event of the 
award of a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee, 
the sum shall be paid only to the minor's legally appointed 
guardian. 1997 
34A-2-405. Employee injured outside state — Entitled 
to compensation — Limitation of time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if an employee who 
has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives 
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment outside of this state, the employee, or the employ-
ee's dependents in case of the employee's death, shall be 
entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. 
(2) This section applies only to those injuries received by 
the employee within six months after leaving this state, unless 
prior to the expiration of the six-month period the employer 
has filed with the division notice that the employer has elected 
to extend such coverage a greater period of time. 1997 
34A-2-406. Exemptions from chapter for employees 
temporarily in state — Conditions — Evi-
dence of insurance. 
(1) Any employee who has been hired in another state and 
the employee's employer are exempt from this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, while the em-
ployee is temporarily within this state doing work for the 
employee's employer if: 
(a) the employer has furnished workers' compensation 
insurance coverage under the workers' compensation or 
similar laws of the other state; 
(b) the coverage covers the employee's employment 
while in this state; and 
(c) (i) the extraterritorial provisions of this chapter 
and Chapter 3 are recognized in the other state and 
employers and employees who are covered in this 
state are likewise exempted from the application of 
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(1) a minor child: 
(a) dies; 
(b) marries; 
(c) becomes 18 years of age; or 
(d) is no longer dependent; or 
(2) the spouse of the employee: 
(a) dies; 
(b) divorces the employee; or 
(c) subject to Section 34A-2-414 relative to the 
remarriage of a spouse, remarries. 2008 
34A-2-416. Additional benefits in special cases. 
(1) Benefits received by a wholly dependent person under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
extend indefinitely if at the termination of the benefits: 
(a) the wholly dependent person is still in a dependent 
condition; and 
(b) under all reasonable circumstances the wholly de-
pendent person should be entitled to additional benefits. 
(2) If benefits are extended under Subsection (1): 
(a) the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved may not be extended; and 
(b) the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund created in Subsection 
34A-2-702(l). 2008 
34A-2-417. Claims and benefits — Time limits for filing 
— Burden of proof. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices or in a perma-
nent total disability case, an employee is entitled to be 
compensated for a medical expense if: 
(a) the medical expense is: 
(i) reasonable in amount; and 
(ii) necessary to treat the industrial accident; and 
(b) the employee submits or makes a reasonable at-
tempt to submit the medical expense: 
(i) to the employee's employer or insurance carrier 
for payment; and 
(ii) within one year from the later of: 
(A) the day on which the medical expense is 
incurred; or 
(B) the day on which the employee knows or in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known that the medical expense is related to the 
industrial accident. 
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2Kb) is barred, 
unless the employee: 
(i) files an application for hearing with the Divi-
sion of Adjudication no later than six years from the 
date of the accident; and 
(ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the 
accident, is able to meet the employee's burden of 
proving that the employee is due the compensation 
claimed under this chapter. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensa-
tion for: 
(i) temporary total disability benefits; 
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits; 
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or 
(iv) permanent total disability benefits. 
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or 
denying an employee's claim for compensation under this 
chapter within a reasonable time period beyond 12 years 
from the date of the accident, if: 
(i) the employee complies with Subsection (2)(a); 
and 
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident: 
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a 
commission approved reemployment plan; 
and 
(II) the results of that commission ap-
proved reemployment plan are not known; or 
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating is-
sues of compensability before the commission. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an applica-
tion for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of 
the employee. 
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4Kb), after an 
employee files an application for hearing within six 
years from the date of the accident, the Division of 
Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why 
the employee's claim should not be dismissed because 
the employee has failed to meet the employee's bur-
den of proof to establish an entitlement to compensa-
tion claimed in the application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4Xa)(i) may 
be entered on the motion of the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrier. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudica-
tion may dismiss a claim: 
(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates 
the merits of the employee's entitlement to the 
compensation claimed in the application for 
hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(ii). 
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under 
Subsection (4)(b), the employee is subject to the time 
limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim compensation 
under this chapter. 
(5) A claim for compensation under this chapter is subject 
to a claim or lien for recovery under Section 26-19-5. 2007 
34A-2-418. Awards — Medical, nursing, hospital, and 
burial expenses — Artificial means and appli-
ances. 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter 
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial 
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the 
injured employee. 
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or the 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in ordinary 
cases as established by rule. 
(3) If a compensable accident results in the breaking of or 
loss of an employee's artificial means or appliance including 
eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a 
replacement of the artificial means or appliance. 
(4) An administrative law judge may require the employer 
or insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or 
appliances or provide the employee with a replacement of any 
artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear 
and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence. 
(5) An administrative law judge may, in unusual cases, 
order, as the administrative law judge considers just and 
proper, the payment of additional sums: 
(a) for burial expenses; or 
(b) to provide for artificial means or appliances. 1997 
34A-2-419. Agreements in addition to compensation 
and benefits. 
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the division, any employer 
securing the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for its employees under Section 34A-2-201 may enter into 
or continue any agreement with the employer's employees 
